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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW

 

Return to Session 8: Trade and Environment

The Trade Debate

Comparative Advantage

Economies of Scale

The "Liberalized Trade" Philosophy

"Race to the Bottom"

Traditional Versus Sustainable Economic Assumptions

 

Comparative Advantage:

"Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson (1969) was once challenged by the mathematician Stanislaw Ulam to "name me one proposition in all of the social sciences which is both true and non-trivial." It was several years later than he thought of the correct response: comparative advantage. "That it is logically true need not be argued before a mathematician; that is is not trivial is attested by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have never been able to grasp the doctrine for themselves or to believe it after it was explained to them."

"What did David Ricardo mean when he coined the term comparative advantage? According to the principle of comparative advantage, the gains from trade follow from allowing an economy to specialise. If a country is relatively better at making wine than wool, it makes sense to put more resources into wine, and to export some of the wine to pay for imports of wool. This is even true if that country is the world's best wool producer, since the country will have more of both wool and wine than it would have without trade. A country does not have to be best at anything to gain from trade. The gains follow from specializing in those activities which, at world prices, the country is relatively better at, even though it may not have an absolute advantage in them. Because it is relative advantage that matters, it is meaningless to say a country has a comparative advantage in nothing. The term is one of the most misunderstood ideas in economics, and is often wrongly assumed to mean an absolute advantage compared with other countries."

"The basis for trade in the Ricardian model is differences in technology between countries. Below we define two different ways to describe technology differences. The first method, called absolute advantage is the way most people understand technology differences. The second method called comparative advantage is a much more difficult concept. As a result even those who learn about comparative advantage often will confuse it with absolute advantage. It is quite common to see misapplications of the principle of comparative advantage in newspaper and journal stories about trade. Many times authors write comparative advantage when in actuality they are describing absolute advantage. This misconception often leads to erroneous implications such as a fear that technology advances in other countries will cause our country to lose its comparative advantage in everything. As will be shown, this is essentially impossible."

"Absolute Advantage: A country has an absolute advantage in the production of a good relative to another country if it can produce the good at lower cost or with higher productivity. Absolute advantage compares industry productivities across countries."

"Opportunity Cost: Opportunity cost is defined generally as the value of the next best opportunity. In the context of national production, the nation has opportunities to produce wine and cheese. If the nation wishes to produce more cheese, then because labor resources are scarce and fully employed, it is necessary to move labor out of wine production in order to increase cheese production. The loss in wine production necessary to produce more cheese represents the opportunity cost to the economy."

" Comparative Advantage: A country has a comparative advantage in the production of a good if it can produce that good at a lower opportunity cost relative to another country.

"The theory of comparative advantage is perhaps the most important concept in international trade theory. It is also one of the most commonly misunderstood principles." The sources of the misunderstandings are easy to identify. First, the principle of comparative advantage is clearly counter-intuitive. Many results from the formal model are contrary to simple logic. Secondly, the theory is easy to confuse with another notion about advantageous trade, known in trade theory as the theory of absolute advantage. The logic behind absolute advantage is quite intuitive. This confusion between these two concepts leads many people to think that they understand comparative advantage when in fact, what they understand, is absolute advantage. Finally, the theory of comparative advantage is all too often presented only in its mathematical form. Using numerical examples or diagrammatic representations are extremely useful in demonstrating the basic results and the deeper implications of the theory. However, it is also easy to see the results mathematically, without ever understanding the basic intuition of the theory.

The early logic that free trade could be advantageous for countries was based on the concept of absolute advantages in production. Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations,

"If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage. " (Book IV, Section ii, 12)

The idea here is simple and intuitive. If our country can produce some set of goods at lower cost than a foreign country, and if the foreign country can produce some other set of goods at a lower cost than we can produce them, then clearly it would be best for us to trade our relatively cheaper goods for their relatively cheaper goods. In this way both countries may gain from trade.

The original idea of comparative advantage dates to the early part of the 19th century. Although the model describing the theory is commonly referred to as the "Ricardian model", the original description of the idea can be found in an Essay on the External Corn Trade by Robert Torrens in 1815. David Ricardo formalized the idea using a compelling, yet simple, numerical example in his 1817 book titled, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. The idea appeared again in James Mill's Elements of Political Economy in 1821. Finally, the concept became a key feature of international political economy upon the publication of Principles of Political Economy by John Stuart Mill in 1848.

David Ricardo's Assumptions

[Assumptions implicit within Ricardo's model are as follows:

  • "Trade occurs due to differences in production technology.

The Ricardian model is constructed such that the only difference between countries is in their production technologies. All other features are assumed identical across countries. Since trade would occur and be advantageous, the model highlights one on the main reasons why countries trade; namely, differences in technology.

  • Trade is advantageous for everyone in both countries.

Although most models of trade suggest that some people would benefit and some lose from free trade, the Ricardian model shows that everyone could benefit from trade. This can be shown using an aggregate representation of welfare (national indifference curves) or by calculating the change in real wages to workers. However, one of the reasons for this outcome is the simplifying assumption that there is only one factor of production.

  • Even a technologically inferior country can benefit from free trade.

This interesting result was first shown by Ricardo using a simple numerical example. The analysis highlights the importance of producing a country's comparative advantage good rather than its absolute advantage good.

  • A developed country can compete against some low foreign wage industries.

The Ricardian model shows the possibility that an industry in a developed country could compete against an industry in a less developed country even though the [competing] industry pays its workers much lower wages."

Comparative Advantage Illustration:

Here is a rather straightforward comparison of comparative advantage. REMEMBER, comparative advantage means that a country should specialize in trade that minimizes opportunity costs!

 

Comparative Advantage Illustration

David Ricardo, working in the early part of the 19th century, realised that absolute advantage was a limited case of a more general theory. Consider Table 1. It can be seen that Portugal can produce both wheat and wine more cheaply than England (ie it has an absolute advantage in both commodities). What David Ricardo saw was that it could still be mutually beneficial for both countries to specialise and trade.

Table 1

Country

Wheat

Wine

 

Cost Per Unit In Man Hours

Cost Per Unit In Man Hours

England

15

30

Portugal

10

15

In Table 1, a unit of wine in England costs the same amount to produce as 2 units of wheat. Production of an extra unit of wine means foregoing production of 2 units of wheat (ie the opportunity cost of a unit of wine is 2 units of wheat). In Portugal, a unit of wine costs 1.5 units of wheat to produce (ie the opportunity cost of a unit of wine is 1.5 units of wheat in Portugal). Because relative or comparative costs differ, it will still be mutually advantageous for both countries to trade even though Portugal has an absolute advantage in both commodities.

Portugal is relatively better at producing wine than wheat: so Portugal is said to have a COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE in the production of wine. England is relatively better at producing wheat than wine: so England is said to have a comparative advantage in the production of wheat.

Table 2 shows how trade might be advantageous. Costs of production are as set out in Table 1. England is assumed to have 270 man hours available for production. Before trade takes place it produces and consumes 8 units of wheat and 5 units of wine. Portugal has fewer labour resources with 180 man hours of labour available for production. Before trade takes place it produces and consumes 9 units of wheat and 6 units of wine. Total production between the two economies is 17 units of wheat and 11 units of wine.

Table 2

C o u n t r y

Production

Before Trade

After Trade

Wheat

Wine

Wheat

Wine

E n g l a n d

8

5

18

0

P o r t u g a l

9

6

0

12

T o t a l

17

11

18

12

If both countries now specialise, Portugal producing only wine and England producing only wheat, total production is 18 units of wheat and 12 units of wine. Specialisation has enabled the world economy to increase production by 1 unit of wheat and 1 unit of wine.

The simple theory of comparative advantage outlined above makes a number of important assumptions:

  • There are no transport costs.

  • Costs are constant and there are no economies of scale.

  • There are only two economies producing two goods.

  • The theory assumes that traded goods are homogeneous (i.e. identical).

  • Factors of production are assumed to be perfectly mobile.

  • There are no tariffs or other trade barriers.

  • There is perfect knowledge, so that all buyers and sellers know where the cheapest goods can be found internationally.”

 

"A country is said to have a comparative advantage in the production of a good (say cloth) if it can produce cloth at a lower opportunity cost than another country. The opportunity cost of cloth production is defined as the amount of wine that must be given up in order to produce one more unit of cloth. Thus England would have the comparative advantage in cloth production relative to Portugal if it must give up less wine to produce another unit of cloth than the amount of wine that Portugal would have to give up to produce another unit of cloth.

All in all, this condition is rather confusing. Suffice it to say, that it is quite possible, indeed likely, that although England may be less productive in producing both goods relative to Portugal, it will nonetheless have a comparative advantage in the production of one of the two goods. Indeed there is only one circumstance in which England would not have a comparative advantage in either good, and in this case Portugal also would not have a comparative advantage in either good. In other words, either each country has the comparative advantage in one of the two goods or neither country has a comparative advantage in anything.

Another way to define comparative advantage is by comparing productivities across industries and countries. Thus suppose, as before, that Portugal is more productive than England in the production of both cloth and wine. If Portugal is twice as productive in cloth production relative to England but three times as productive in wine, then Portugal's comparative advantage is in wine, the good in which its productivity advantage is greatest. Similarly, England's comparative advantage good is cloth, the good in which its productivity disadvantage is least. This implies that to benefit from specialization and free trade, Portugal should specialize and trade the good in which it is "most best" at producing, while England should specialize and trade the good in which it is "least worse" at producing.

Note that trade based on comparative does not contradict Adam Smith's notion of advantageous trade based on absolute advantage. If as in Smith's example, England were more productive in cloth production and Portugal were more productive in wine, then by we would say that England has an absolute advantage in cloth production while Portugal has an absolute advantage in wine. If we calculated comparative advantages, then England would also have the comparative advantage in cloth and Portugal would have the comparative advantage in wine. In this case, gains from trade could be realized if both countries specialized in their comparative, and absolute, advantage goods. Advantageous trade based on comparative advantage, then, covers a larger set of circumstances while still including the case of absolute advantage and hence is a more general theory."

Economies of Scale:

Another concept related to "comparative advantage" is the concept of "economies of scale." Economies of scale can be conceptualized in the following way. "When more units of a good or a service can be produced on a larger scale, yet with (on average) less input costs, economies of scale (ES) are said to be achieved. Alternatively, this means that as a company grows and production units increase, a company will have a better chance to decrease its costs. According to theory, economic growth may be achieved when economies of scale are realized.

Adam Smith identified the division of labor and specialization as the two key means to achieve a larger return on production. Through these two techniques, employees would not only be able to concentrate on a specific task, but with time, improve the skills necessary to perform their jobs. The tasks could then be performed better and faster. Hence, through such efficiency, time and money could be saved while production levels increased."

"Just like there are economies of scale, diseconomies of scale (DS) also exist. This occurs when production is less than in proportion to inputs. What this means is that there are inefficiencies within the firm or industry resulting in rising average costs."

"Alfred Marshall made a distinction between internal and external economies of scale. When a company reduces costs and increases production, internal economies of scale have been achieved. External economies of scale occur outside of a firm, within an industry. Thus, when an industry's scope of operations expands due to, for example, the creation of a better transportation network, resulting in a subsequent decrease in cost for a company working within that industry, external economies of scale are said to have been achieved. With external ES, all firms within the industry will benefit."

The "Liberalized Trade" Philosophy

Authors of the text Environmental Law & Policy (Salzman & Thompson, 2003) are critical of "liberalized trade" (which is to say global free trade) fearing that it will result in the overuse of natural resources, the creation of excessive and unnecessary waste, and the ultimate weakening of environmental standards. An alternative perspective is presented by the Washington Business Roundtable:

"An honest and intelligent debate about the impact of trade and investment liberalization on the United States requires the separation of fact from fiction.

MYTH: Liberalization undermines environmental protection laws and harms the environment.

TRUTH:

  • Trade agreements do not dictate U.S. environmental law or undermine U.S. environmental laws. International trade agreements require the United States only to apply the same standards to imported products that it applies to domestic products. Trade agreements do not prevent other countries from applying the same environmental standards to U.S. goods that they apply to their own goods.

  • To achieve environmental sustainability, countries need good environmental laws and effective enforcement of those laws. Liberalized trade produces higher incomes and economic growth that make it possible for countries to improve their environmental laws and law enforcement.

  • The U.S.-Singapore and U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreements require the governments of the United States, Chile and Singapore to (1) effectively enforce environmental laws, (2) ensure that they do not weaken their environmental laws to encourage trade or investment, and (3) ensure that violations of their respective environmental laws are subject to sanctions by legal procedure.

  • Liberalized trade helps improve environmental protection by lowering the barriers to the sale of environmental technologies; enabling new investments in environmental infrastructure; and making it easier for environmental scientists, engineers and technicians to provide services to developing countries.

MYTH: Liberalization undermines protection for labor.

TRUTH:

  • Trade agreements do not require the United States to change its labor laws or undermine U.S. laws protecting labor rights.

  • Trade liberalization does not undermine worker rights. In fact, the opposite is true. In a study of 44 developing countries that engaged in significant trade liberalization, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that “there was notably no case where the trade reforms were followed by a worsening of association rights” and that freedom-of-association rights improved in 32 of the countries after trade liberalization.

  • The U.S.-Singapore and U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreements require the governments of the United States, Chile and Singapore to (1) effectively enforce labor laws, (2) work to ensure that International Labor Organization (ILO) principles are protected by their domestic laws, (3) ensure that they do not weaken their labor laws to encourage trade or investment, and (4) ensure that legal proceedings are available to sanction violations of labor laws.

MYTH: Trade agreements undermine U.S. sovereignty by giving international bureaucrats the power to strike down U.S. laws.

TRUTH:

  • Only the U.S. Congress and the U.S. president can make U.S. law, no international institution or foreign country can change U.S. laws.

  • Decisions by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dispute panels cannot override U.S. law. Those panels can only issue recommendations, and these recommendations have no force in the United States. Only the Congress and the president can decide whether to implement a panel recommendation. They can (1) revise U.S. law, (2) compensate a country harmed by a U.S. law through reductions in tariffs or other trade barriers, or (3) do nothing — and accept the risk that the other country may retaliate by raising tariffs or other barriers to U.S. exports.

  • The United States may withdraw from the WTO, NAFTA, free trade agreements and all other trade agreements at any time.

MYTH: Trade liberalization increases U.S. trade deficits.

TRUTH:

  • The United States had trade deficits before the WTO existed and would have them if there were no WTO. The merchandise trade deficit generally grows when the economy grows and shrinks when the economy shrinks.

  • The trade deficit is a result of American prosperity. The strength of the U.S. economy means U.S. consumers are able to purchase a wide variety of goods and services, including imports.

  • Imports help keep inflation low by ensuring that U.S. consumers have access to a variety of competitively priced goods and that producers have access to low-cost inputs.

MYTH: Trade liberalization causes good U.S. jobs to move overseas.

TRUTH:

  • Trade creates good jobs in the United States. Ten percent of all U.S. jobs (approximately 12 million) depend on exports. One in five factory jobs depend on international trade. Jobs that depend on trade generally pay about 13 to 18 percent more than the average U.S. wage.

  • U.S. plants that export increase employment 2 to 4 percent faster annually compared to plants that do not export. Exporting plants also are less likely to go out of business.

  • U.S. firms that are deeply integrated in worldwide markets are more likely to succeed in generating good jobs at home. Such jobs pay an average wage in the United States of $15,000 more than jobs in firms that are less globally integrated, or $50,000 versus $35,000.

  • Contrary to the predictions of a “giant sucking sound,” NAFTA has created good jobs in the United States. In the first eight years of NAFTA, the number of U.S. jobs supported by merchandise exports to Mexico and Canada grew from 914,000 to 2.9 million. Between 1993 and 2000, U.S. employment grew by 20 million. Real hourly compensation in the U.S. manufacturing sector increased by 14.4 percent in the 10 years following NAFTA implementation, as compared to 6.5 percent in the 10 years prior to NAFTA."

"Race to the Bottom"

According to the World Bank in its report entitled "Is Globalization Causing a 'Race To The Bottom' in Environmental Standards?" (part four of a set of World Bank briefing papers on this topic) the concern regarding a "race to the bottom" resulting from lax environmental standards produced by free global trade is unfounded. The authors of this report present their position as follows:

"It is argued that increased international competition for investment will cause countries to lower environmental regulations (or to retain poor ones), a “race to the bottom” in environmental standards as countries fight to attract foreign capital and keep domestic investment at home. However there is no evidence that the cost of environmental protection has ever been the determining factor in foreign investment decisions.  

Factors such as labor and raw material costs, transparent regulation and protection of property rights are likely to be much more important, even for polluting industries. Indeed, foreign-owned plants in developing countries, precisely the ones that according to the theory would be most attracted by low standards, tend to be less polluting than indigenous plants in the same industry. Most multinational companies adopt near-uniform standards globally, often well above the local government-set standards . This suggests that they relocate plants to developing countries for reasons other than low environmental standards. Paradoxically, pollution [as] an effect may be more important within the national boundaries of a developed country than between rich and poor countries. Within a national boundary many of the other locational factors are less important, and so local environmental regulations might matter more."

"Countries do not become permanent pollution havens because along with increases in income come increased demands for environmental quality and a better institutional capacity to supply environmental regulation. One World Bank study of 145 countries identified a strong positive correlation between income levels and the strictness of environmental regulation.

 Indeed the so-called "California Effect" in the US demonstrates that there is nothing inevitable about a ‘race to the bottom. After the passage of the US 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, California repeatedly adopted stricter emissions standards than other US states. Instead of a flight of investment and jobs from California, however, other states began adopting similar, tougher emissions standards. A self-reinforcing “race to the top" was thus put in place in which California helped lift standards throughout the US. [Some researchers attribute this phenomenon] to the "lure of green markets" - car manufacturers were willing to meet California's higher standards to avoid losing such a large market and once they had met the standard in one state, they could easily meet it in every state."

The World Bank also attributes the penchant for some to associate  a "race to the bottom" mentality with  a general (and widespread) misunderstanding of what is entailed with globalization. Accordingly, the World Bank describes "Globalization" in the following fashion:

"Globalization is one of the most charged issues of the day. It is everywhere in public discourse – in TV sound bites and slogans on placards, in web-sites and learned journals, in parliaments, corporate boardrooms and labor meeting halls. Extreme opponents charge it with impoverishing the world's poor, enriching the rich and devastating the environment, while fervent supporters see it as a high-speed elevator to universal peace and prosperity. What is one to think?

Amazingly for so widely used a term, there does not appear to be any precise, widely-agreed definition. Indeed the breadth of meanings attached to it seems to be increasing rather than narrowing over time, taking on cultural, political and other connotations in addition to the economic. However, the most common or core sense of economic globalization  surely refers to the observation that in recent years a quickly rising share of economic activity in the world seems to be taking place between people who live in different countries (rather than in the same country). This growth in cross-border economic activities takes various forms:

International Trade: A growing share of spending on goods and services is devoted to imports from other countries. And a growing share of what countries produce is sold to foreigners as exports. Among rich or developed countries the share of international trade in total output (exports plus imports of goods relative to GDP) rose from 27 to 39 percent between 1987 and 1997. For developing countries it rose from 10 to 17 percent. (The source for many of these data is the World Bank's World Development Indicators 2000.)

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Firms based in one country increasingly make investments to establish and run business operations in other countries. US firms invested US$133 billion abroad in 1998, while foreign firms invested US$193 billion in the US. Overall world FDI flows more than tripled between 1988 and 1998, from US$192 billion to US$610 billion, and the share of FDI to GDP is generally rising in both developed and developing countries. Developing countries received about a quarter of world FDI inflows in 1988-98 on average, though the share fluctuated quite a bit from year to year. This is now the largest form of private capital inflow to developing countries.

Capital Market Flows. In many countries (especially in the developed world) savers increasingly diversify their portfolios to include foreign financial assets (foreign bonds, equities, loans), while borrowers increasingly turn to foreign sources of funds, along with domestic ones. While flows of this kind to developing countries also rose sharply in the 1990s, they have been much more volatile than either trade or FDI flows, and have also been restricted to a narrower range of 'emerging market' countries.

Overall Observations about Globalization:

First, it is crucial in discussing globalization to carefully distinguish between its different forms. International trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and capital market flows raise distinct issues and have distinct consequences: potential benefits on the one hand, and costs or risks on the other, calling for different assessments and policy responses. The World Bank generally favors greater openness to trade and FDI because the evidence suggests that the payoffs for economic development and poverty reduction tend to be large relative to potential costs or risks (while also paying attention to specific policies to mitigate or alleviate these costs and risks).

It is more cautious about liberalization of other financial or capital market flows, whose high volatility can sometimes foster boom-and-bust cycles and financial crises with large economic costs, as in the emerging-market crises in East Asia and elsewhere in 1997-98. Here the emphasis needs to be more on building up supportive domestic institutions and policies that reduce the risks of financial crisis before undertaking an orderly and carefully sequenced capital account opening.

Second, the extent to which different countries participate in globalization is also far from uniform. For many of the poorest least-developed countries the problem is not that they are being impoverished by globalization, but that they are in danger of being largely excluded from it. The minuscule 0.4 percent share of these countries in world trade in 1997 was down by half from 1980. Their access to foreign private investment remains negligible. Far from condemning these countries to continued isolation and poverty, the urgent task of the international community is to help them become better integrated in the world economy, providing assistance to help them build up needed supporting institutions and policies, as well as by continuing to enhance their access to world markets.

Third, it is important to recognize that economic globalization is not a wholly new trend. Indeed, at a basic level, it has been an aspect of the human story from earliest times, as widely scattered populations gradually became involved in more extensive and complicated economic relations. In the modern era, globalization saw an earlier flowering towards the end of the 19th century, mainly among the countries that are today developed or rich. For many of these countries trade and capital market flows relative to GDP were close to or higher than in recent years. That earlier peak of globalization was reversed in the first half of the 20th century, a time of growing protectionism, in a context of bitter national and great-power strife, world wars, revolutions, rising authoritarian ideologies, and massive economic and political instability.

In the last 50 years the tide has flown towards greater globalization once more. International relations have been more tranquil (at least compared to the previous half century), supported by the creation and consolidation of the United Nations system as a means of peacefully resolving political differences between states, and of institutions like the GATT (today the WTO), which provide a framework of rules for countries to manage their commercial policies. The end of colonialism brought scores of independent new actors onto the world scene, while also removing a shameful stain associated with the earlier 19th century episode of globalization. The 1994 Uruguay Round of the GATT saw developing countries become engaged on a wide range of multilateral international trade issues for the first time.

The pace of international economic integration accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, as governments everywhere reduced policy barriers that hampered international trade and investment. Opening to the outside world has been part of a more general shift towards greater reliance on markets and private enterprise, especially as many developing and communist countries came to see that high levels of government planning and intervention were failing to deliver the desired development outcomes.

China's sweeping economic reforms since the end of the 1970s, the peaceful dissolution of communism in the Soviet bloc at the end of the 1980s, and the taking root and steady growth of market based reforms in democratic India in the 1990s are among the most striking examples of this trend. Globalization has also been fostered by technological progress, which is reducing the costs of transportation and communications between countries. Dramatic falls in the cost of telecommunications, of processing, storing and transmitting information, make it much easier to track down and close on business opportunities around the world, to coordinate operations in far-flung locations, or to trade online services that previously were not internationally tradable at all.

Finally, given this backdrop, it may not be surprising (though it is not very helpful) that 'globalization' is sometimes used in a much broader economic sense, as another name for capitalism or the market economy. When used in this sense the concerns expressed are really about key features of the market economy, such as production by privately-owned and profit-motivated corporations, frequent reshuffling of resources according to changes in supply and demand, and unpredictable and rapid technological change. It is certainly important to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the market economy as such, and to better understand the institutions and policies needed to make it work most effectively. And societies need to think hard about how to best manage the implications of rapid technological change. But there is little to be gained by confusing these distinct (though related) issues with economic globalization in its core sense, that is the expansion of cross-border economic ties.

Conclusion. The best way to deal with the changes being brought about by the international integration of markets for goods, services and capital is to be open and honest about them. As this series of Briefs note, globalization brings opportunities, but it also brings risks. While exploiting the opportunities for higher economic growth and better living standards that more openness brings, policy makers - international, national and local – also face the challenge of mitigating the risks for the poor, vulnerable and marginalized, and of increasing equity and inclusion.

Even when poverty is falling overall, there can be regional or sectoral increases about which society needs to be concerned. Over the last century the forces of globalization have been among those that have contributed to a huge improvement in human welfare, including raising countless millions out of poverty. Going forward, these forces have the potential to continue bringing great benefits to the poor, but how strongly they do so will also continue to depend crucially on factors such as the quality of overall macroeconomic policies, the workings of institutions, both formal and informal, the existing structure of assets, and the available resources, among many others. In order to arrive at fair and workable approaches to these very real human needs, government must listen to the voices of all its citizens."

 Traditional versus Sustainable Economics:

Many policy analysts (such as Salzman and Thompson) are not impressed by the arguments of the World Bank and are troubled by the increasing orientation of the world economy toward "liberalization" and "globalization." Their concerns are primarily based upon their pessismism regarding the future of so-called "conventional" economic models that, among other things, does not routinely include the replacement costs for natural resources or a full accounting of "waste" production into their economic models. These analysts tend to argue for the replacement of "conventional," "traditional" or "capitalist" models with what they call "sustainable economies."  

According to the Center of Economic Conversion economics can be conceptualized in a variety of ways. For instance, "Subsistence economies, which prevail in the more remote and less industrialized areas of the world, place much value on ecology and living in harmony within the natural limits of their environment. Capitalist and Socialist economies both share the goal of generating material wealth but differ in their approach. Capitalist economies emphasize individual freedom while Socialist economies emphasize social equality. The Buddhist economic system, as described by E.F. Schumacher and lived by some Eastern countries, is centered on the goal of human fulfillment and the development of character."

In the interest of understanding what is meant by the ideal of a "sustainable economy" Daniel O'Connor, in his article "Sustainable Growth: Irreconcilable Visions?" published on the web-based Economics Roundtable, presents two separate visions of economic systems. In the first system (see illustration below)

O'Donnell conceptualizes an ecological economic system as one whose growth is contained and limited by the resources of the ecosystem. By comparison, a classical economic system (such as the one depicted below) operates as if there are no ecological constraints to growth.

Such classical formulations of economics would appear to be unrealistic given what appears to be the inherent finite nature of natural resources. Consequently, based upon this comparison, a sustainable economy could be defined (as it has been by the Ecosystem Health program at the University of Western Ontario) as an "Economic system in which the number of people and the quantity of goods are maintained at some constant level. This level is ecologically sustainable over time and meets at least the basic needs of all members of the population." 

Sustainable economies are by definition more complex that traditional economic models as they attend to a variety of indicators beyond those "growth" oriented indicators narrowly associated with supply and demand. The table below makes a cogent presentation of these economic indicators and how "traditional" and "sustainable" economic models construe each indicator:

Clearly, the move toward a "sustainable" economic model entails much more complexity and government involvement in regulatory affairs, both economically as well as socially and environmentally. The prospects of such a model being widely adopted, while heralded by many as necessary for the survival of human beings on the planet, is also decried by others. For an interesting alternative opinion on the merits of sustainable economies read Jacqueline R. Kasun's thoughtful article "Doomsday Everyday: Sustainable Economics, Sustainable Tyranny."

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